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The European Commission—acting as a European competition author-
ity—cleared Visa’s European cross-border interchange fees on July 24,
2002, accepting undertakings given by Visa.
Let me begin by making two preliminary remarks. In making a ruling
based on competition law, the Commission did not “regulate” Visa’s inter-
change fees. Its role as an antitrust agency was to investigate alleged compe-
tition problems. Having done so, the Commission accepted undertakings
devised and offered by Visa because it considered those undertakings suffi-
cient to remove the competition concern. The initiative to find a remedy
remained with the market.
This also means that the solution found in the Visa case was not the only
possible outcome. As a number of competition authorities within the
European Union (EU) are currently investigating interchange fees and
related issues, there is a need to ensure that the methodologies applied are
coherent. But the facts and their assessment may differ from case to case
and from market to market, and future decisions will have to take into
account evolving market conditions and remain open to new arguments.
I will limit myself to three points in summarizing the Commission’s findings:
• The competition concern identified.
• The possible efficiency justifications for interchange fees.
• The remedy proposed by Visa and accepted by the Commission.
The Commission’s case was based on a two-fold concern. On the one
hand, the Commission qualified Visa’s European cross-border interchange
fees
1 as a collective and confidential agreement between competitors (Visa’s
member banks) that restricted the freedom of individual banks to decide
their own pricing policies. The agreement therefore distorted competition
in the markets for card issuing and merchant acquiring. In particular, inter-
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 change fees were found to set a de facto floor for the fees charged by banks
to merchants. Because Visa’s interchange fees were a business secret, those
who paid the interchange fee in the end—the merchants—could not know
its level and therefore could not effectively negotiate the merchant fee.
On the other hand, the Commission found that there were upward 
pressures on the level of the interchange fee, in particular, the fact that most
banks were members of both the Visa and the competing MasterCard 
systems and therefore were likely to issue whichever of the two brands of
card had the higher interchange level and brought them the most revenue.
The possibility of merchants ceasing to accept Visa if the interchange fee
was too high was not sufficiently strong enough to constrain this upward
pressure, as long as the interchange fee did not reach exceedingly high 
levels. This was due to a “lock-in” effect. Once a merchant accepts Visa
cards and is then faced with an increase in the interchange fees, the 
merchant’s recovery from this cost increase through a small price increase for
all goods sold will normally lead to a smaller fall in turnover than ceasing to
accept Visa cards. There was thus a possibility that the interchange fee was
set at a revenue-maximizing, output-limiting level, rather than at the level
maximizing the output of the Visa system.
At the same time, the Commission did accept possible efficiency justifica-
tions for interchange fees. This did not mean that the Commission 
considered interchange fees to be inherent in card payment systems or indis-
pensable for their operation—indeed there have been for many years 
successful debit card systems in Europe that have achieved a high degree of
market penetration without interchange fees or using different mechanisms.
But the Commission accepted that if a network opted to adopt interchange
fees, it could, in principle (provided it met certain conditions as detailed
below), quote certain efficiencies to justify this choice under competition law.
Two possible efficiencies should be mentioned. The Commission accepted
that a collective, multilateral agreement between banks to set interchange
fees may lead to efficiency gains, compared to multiple bilateral agreements,
for instance, due to lower negotiation and transaction costs. And the
Commission recognized that in a payment card system characterized by 
network externalities, interchange fees can help optimize the utility of the 
network to its users (merchants and cardholders). Given the difficulties of
measuring the average marginal utility of a Visa card payment to each 
category of user, some acceptable proxy for this had to be found.
European competition law (article 81 of the EU Treaty) provides for a
two-step analysis. Once a competition authority has established that an
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 agreement appreciably restricts competition, grounds for a possible exemp-
tion based on efficiencies and consumer benefits are examined at a second
stage. The law allows balancing the efficiencies and consumer benefits that
an agreement between banks may generate against the restrictions to com-
petition that such an agreement may cause. If the former outweigh the lat-
ter, then the agreement may be cleared. That exemption clause of article 81
requires that a “fair share of the benefit” (the efficiency gain) be passed on
to consumers (the customers in the relevant market). When examining
such a justification for a restrictive agreement under the terms of the
exemption clause, the burden of proof shifts to the companies involved.
The Commission’s investigation had shown that it was difficult to see how
market forces alone could remove the competition concerns identified, so
a remedy was needed. Visa proposed a remedy which the Commission
accepted for a period of time ending in 2007.
Visa’s undertaking introduced an objective benchmark for its interchange
fee. The benchmark was to be set at the level of the cost of supplying Visa
payment services and would not exceed the cost of the services which issuing
banks provide wholly or partly to the benefit of merchants. The benchmark
includes three cost categories: (1) the cost of processing transactions, (2) the
cost of providing the payment guarantee, and (3) the cost of the free-fund-
ing period. Visa also committed to cap its interchange fees at an absolute
amount for a limited period of time.
2The cap does not entirely prevent Visa
from setting differentiated interchange rates for different types of card 
payment (for example, paper-based or electronic) to provide an incentive for
certain ways of using a card, as long as the weighted average cost does not
exceed the benchmark. Finally, Visa committed to giving merchants more
information about its interchange fees.
WHAT IS THE OUTCOME OF THAT DECISION TODAY?
The Commission’s decision has influenced other competition authorities
within the European Union. Other authorities have adopted the cost-based
approach. But different outcomes remain possible. Different market 
conditions, with interchange fees set separately in domestic markets, mean
that the analysis of facts and the conclusions on possible solutions need not
necessarily lead to identical results.
The Commission has not become involved in determining the cost bench-
mark for Visa’s interchange fees; it limits itself to monitoring whether Visa’s cost
calculations are acceptable. Even so, it can be queried whether that level of
ongoing monitoring does not go beyond what an antitrust agency can provide.
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It has also become clear that addressing interchange fees may not be the
only way—and may not be sufficient—to ensure competition in card pay-
ment markets. Merchant acquiring in Europe is still largely restricted to
domestic markets, and some of these markets may not be sufficiently com-
petitive. Other network rules may dampen competition. Visa and
MasterCard have recently relaxed some of these rules.
3
ENDNOTES
1The set of fees covered by the Commission’s decision was Visa’s EU intraregional
interchange reimbursement fee scheme for consumer cards, applicable to cross-
border Visa consumer card transactions at merchant outlets in the then-15 EU
member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
2The weighted average interchange fee for cross-border debit card payments will
not exceed ¤0.28 until 2007; the weighted average interchange fee for credit and
deferred debit card payments will be reduced to 0.7 percent by 2007.
3Visa and MasterCard recently withdrew issuing-before-acquiring requirements
for their members.